Non solo vittime dello Stato islamico, i cristiani siriani sono vittime anche del regime siriano: sono circa 450 i siriani ortodossi e cattolici arrestati, torturati e, molti di loro scomparsi, […]
Giorno: 30 dicembre 2014
#Homs, #Siria – 30 dicembre 2014 – Prosegue per il quarto giorno consecutivo lo…
#Homs, #Siria – 30 dicembre 2014 –
Prosegue per il quarto giorno consecutivo lo sciopero della fame iniziato sabato scorso da decine di prigionieri della prigione centrale di Homs in segno di protesta per quella che è da loro considerata una …
Chronik-Fotos
#Homs, #Siria – 30 dicembre 2014 –
Prosegue per il quarto giorno consecutivo lo sciopero della fame iniziato sabato scorso da decine di prigionieri della prigione centrale di Homs in segno di protesta per quella che è da loro considerata una detenzione arbitraria ed illegale. Molti si trovano ancora in attesa di giudizio mentre altri sono stati condannati senza processo, secondo quanto da loro affermato.
Video
https://youtu.be/uDL207lXoco (30 dicembre 2014)
https://youtu.be/gd6HMrqHSTg (27 dicembre 2014)
https://youtu.be/IlY4oFOrn78 (29 dicembre 2014)
Testimonianza di un detenuto della prigione
http://youtu.be/jQ8D8G81KIw
Foto scattata oggi all’interno della prigione. Continua a leggere →
#Homs, #Siria – 30 dicembre 2014 – Prosegue per il quarto giorno consecutivo lo…
#Homs, #Siria – 30 dicembre 2014 –
Prosegue per il quarto giorno consecutivo lo sciopero della fame iniziato sabato scorso da decine di prigionieri della prigione centrale di Homs in segno di protesta per quella che è da loro considerata una detenzione arbitraria ed illegale. Molti si trovano ancora in attesa di giudizio mentre altri sono stati condannati senza processo, secondo quanto da loro affermato.
Video
https://youtu.be/uDL207lXoco (30 dicembre 2014)
https://youtu.be/gd6HMrqHSTg (27 dicembre 2014)
https://youtu.be/IlY4oFOrn78 (29 dicembre 2014)
Testimonianza di un detenuto della prigione
http://youtu.be/jQ8D8G81KIw
Foto scattata oggi all’interno della prigione.
Islamic State: a threat to South East Asia (Afghanistan, Pakistan, India) and to Nato-Resolute Support Mission?
by Claudio Bertolotti
The Islamic State of Iraq and Levant (ISIL, ISIS, or more simply IS) is attempting to expand its influence from the Middle East to Asia, in particular to Pakistan, India and Afghanistan.
A possible confirmation of the results obtained by the Jihadi-group linked to the IS could be confirmed by the 4th of October declaration of allegiance of a part of the Pakistani Taliban (Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan, TTP) to the group and its chief, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi (the self-appointed Caliph Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi Qureshi al Hussaini). The TTP is still formally allied with al Qaeda, and operates mainly in Pakistan’s northwestern tribal areas near the border with Afghanistan.
It is reported that Shahidullah Shahid, the TTP’ spokesman, and five senior members and important regional leaders of the movement vowed allegiance to the IS; in particular the leaders who declared their support to the IS are the regional heads in the northwestern cities of Peshawar, Hangu, the Orakzai, Kurram and Khyber tribal areas (in total is assessed the amount of the defecting groups could involve 700/1000 fighters).
This event, which could underscores divisions among Islamist Armed Opposition Groups as the IS rises, marked the first instance of a major contingent of Taliban figures signaling, on the one hand, a renouncement of fealty to the Afghan Taliban’s leader, Mullah Mohammad Omar; on the other hand, this shift in loyalties could, firstly, weaken the Afghan Taliban and, secondly, create more vulnerabilities to the Pakistan and Afghanistan states because of the violence and the aggressive policy largely used by the IS in Iraq and Syria.
But, what is important to underline is that, even if these commanders could remain part of the Pakistani Taliban’s organization, they will probably represent IS in Pakistan.
A possible confirmation of the results obtained by the Jihadi-group linked to the IS could be confirmed by the 4th of October declaration of allegiance of a part of the Pakistani Taliban (Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan, TTP) to the group and its chief, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi (the self-appointed Caliph Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi Qureshi al Hussaini). The TTP is still formally allied with al Qaeda, and operates mainly in Pakistan’s northwestern tribal areas near the border with Afghanistan.
It is reported that Shahidullah Shahid, the TTP’ spokesman, and five senior members and important regional leaders of the movement vowed allegiance to the IS; in particular the leaders who declared their support to the IS are the regional heads in the northwestern cities of Peshawar, Hangu, the Orakzai, Kurram and Khyber tribal areas (in total is assessed the amount of the defecting groups could involve 700/1000 fighters).
This event, which could underscores divisions among Islamist Armed Opposition Groups as the IS rises, marked the first instance of a major contingent of Taliban figures signaling, on the one hand, a renouncement of fealty to the Afghan Taliban’s leader, Mullah Mohammad Omar; on the other hand, this shift in loyalties could, firstly, weaken the Afghan Taliban and, secondly, create more vulnerabilities to the Pakistan and Afghanistan states because of the violence and the aggressive policy largely used by the IS in Iraq and Syria.
But, what is important to underline is that, even if these commanders could remain part of the Pakistani Taliban’s organization, they will probably represent IS in Pakistan.
IS, Al-Qaeda and Jihadi propaganda in Pakistan, Afghanistan and India: weakness and strengths.
There are signs that the IS could gain grip in South East Asian countries, in particular in Pakistan, thanks to propaganda and recruitment activities. In October, a manifesto was distributed in Peshawar areas, inviting people to join the group in order to establish a Muslim caliphate; at the same time stickers and wall drawings have been spotted, as well as sporting IS t-shirts have been distributed within Indian Muslim areas.
In addition, open sources reported that some Pakistanis and Afghanis are operating in Syria and Iraq fighting under the IS flag, as well as some Indians joined IS.
As response, Al-Qaeda is actively reacting to IS initiatives. One example is represented by the video message released by the Al Qaeda head, Ayman al-Zawahiri, announcing the establishment of a new group named “Qaedat al-Jihad in the Indian subcontinent”. This initiative, after a long-silence period, could be read as a sign that al-Qaeda is reacting to the IS pressure and “successes” in the Middle East and the attempt to penetrate South East Asia.
In the message, Zawahiri discussed “differences and discord” among jihadists – with possible reference to IS – and called Jihadi fighters to unite, invoking Osama bin Laden, insisting on the concepts of artificial borders (to be deleted) and the “Tawhid” (monotheism).
Simultaneously, the competition is conducted on the “virtual” front through social media campaigns on “Twitter”, “Facebook”, “Youtube”, “Instagram”; in this case IS is winning the competition thanks to an aggressive, effective and successful communication strategy based on western approach and methods.
It is clear that these simultaneous efforts aimed to recruiting fighters and supporters are signs that both the groups are in competition for the dominance in the region, with al Qaeda in trouble seeking to reassert its supremacy as a bursting IS raises in attractiveness.
There are signs that the IS could gain grip in South East Asian countries, in particular in Pakistan, thanks to propaganda and recruitment activities. In October, a manifesto was distributed in Peshawar areas, inviting people to join the group in order to establish a Muslim caliphate; at the same time stickers and wall drawings have been spotted, as well as sporting IS t-shirts have been distributed within Indian Muslim areas.
In addition, open sources reported that some Pakistanis and Afghanis are operating in Syria and Iraq fighting under the IS flag, as well as some Indians joined IS.
As response, Al-Qaeda is actively reacting to IS initiatives. One example is represented by the video message released by the Al Qaeda head, Ayman al-Zawahiri, announcing the establishment of a new group named “Qaedat al-Jihad in the Indian subcontinent”. This initiative, after a long-silence period, could be read as a sign that al-Qaeda is reacting to the IS pressure and “successes” in the Middle East and the attempt to penetrate South East Asia.
In the message, Zawahiri discussed “differences and discord” among jihadists – with possible reference to IS – and called Jihadi fighters to unite, invoking Osama bin Laden, insisting on the concepts of artificial borders (to be deleted) and the “Tawhid” (monotheism).
Simultaneously, the competition is conducted on the “virtual” front through social media campaigns on “Twitter”, “Facebook”, “Youtube”, “Instagram”; in this case IS is winning the competition thanks to an aggressive, effective and successful communication strategy based on western approach and methods.
It is clear that these simultaneous efforts aimed to recruiting fighters and supporters are signs that both the groups are in competition for the dominance in the region, with al Qaeda in trouble seeking to reassert its supremacy as a bursting IS raises in attractiveness.
Brief Analysis
On the one hand, the sum and the connections of the dynamics deriving from the entry of a new group in the area of Afghanistan, Pakistan and India, could drive to more violence; as consequence tensions will rise increasing divisions among the groups, in particular involving more communities and armed opposition groups, religious minorities in Pakistan, India and Afghanistan, as well as non-Sunni Muslims, and those Jihadists consider as heretics. It is assessed that overall violence in the region is likely to rise because if a group is conducting a more aggressive campaign, the other groups will also escalate their activities and initiatives. This could be a direct threat to the stability of Afghanistan and to the US and Nato’s role in the country.
On the other hand, as consequence of the changed equilibrium, Al Qaeda and the IS have significantly stepped up their recruiting efforts in Pakistan and in other South East Asian countries; it changed the regional dynamics: a change which must stimulate analysts and governments to pay attention to the competition between the two groups to enlist radicalized fighters. Fighters that, in particular, could be involved in local conflicts as well as in the global jihad carried out by the IS supporters and leaders.
On the “market” of the regional Jihad there are now two different and contending brands: the traditional “Al-Qaeda style” and the modern and fashionable Islamic State. The second one continues to gain followers.
On the one hand, the sum and the connections of the dynamics deriving from the entry of a new group in the area of Afghanistan, Pakistan and India, could drive to more violence; as consequence tensions will rise increasing divisions among the groups, in particular involving more communities and armed opposition groups, religious minorities in Pakistan, India and Afghanistan, as well as non-Sunni Muslims, and those Jihadists consider as heretics. It is assessed that overall violence in the region is likely to rise because if a group is conducting a more aggressive campaign, the other groups will also escalate their activities and initiatives. This could be a direct threat to the stability of Afghanistan and to the US and Nato’s role in the country.
On the other hand, as consequence of the changed equilibrium, Al Qaeda and the IS have significantly stepped up their recruiting efforts in Pakistan and in other South East Asian countries; it changed the regional dynamics: a change which must stimulate analysts and governments to pay attention to the competition between the two groups to enlist radicalized fighters. Fighters that, in particular, could be involved in local conflicts as well as in the global jihad carried out by the IS supporters and leaders.
On the “market” of the regional Jihad there are now two different and contending brands: the traditional “Al-Qaeda style” and the modern and fashionable Islamic State. The second one continues to gain followers.
Islamic State: a threat to South East Asia (Afghanistan, Pakistan, India) and to Nato-Resolute Support Mission?
by Claudio Bertolotti
The Islamic State of Iraq and Levant (ISIL, ISIS, or more simply IS) is attempting to expand its influence from the Middle East to Asia, in particular to Pakistan, India and Afghanistan.
A possible confirmation of the results obtained by the Jihadi-group linked to the IS could be confirmed by the 4th of October declaration of allegiance of a part of the Pakistani Taliban (Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan, TTP) to the group and its chief, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi (the self-appointed Caliph Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi Qureshi al Hussaini). The TTP is still formally allied with al Qaeda, and operates mainly in Pakistan’s northwestern tribal areas near the border with Afghanistan.
It is reported that Shahidullah Shahid, the TTP’ spokesman, and five senior members and important regional leaders of the movement vowed allegiance to the IS; in particular the leaders who declared their support to the IS are the regional heads in the northwestern cities of Peshawar, Hangu, the Orakzai, Kurram and Khyber tribal areas (in total is assessed the amount of the defecting groups could involve 700/1000 fighters).
This event, which could underscores divisions among Islamist Armed Opposition Groups as the IS rises, marked the first instance of a major contingent of Taliban figures signaling, on the one hand, a renouncement of fealty to the Afghan Taliban’s leader, Mullah Mohammad Omar; on the other hand, this shift in loyalties could, firstly, weaken the Afghan Taliban and, secondly, create more vulnerabilities to the Pakistan and Afghanistan states because of the violence and the aggressive policy largely used by the IS in Iraq and Syria.
But, what is important to underline is that, even if these commanders could remain part of the Pakistani Taliban’s organization, they will probably represent IS in Pakistan.
A possible confirmation of the results obtained by the Jihadi-group linked to the IS could be confirmed by the 4th of October declaration of allegiance of a part of the Pakistani Taliban (Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan, TTP) to the group and its chief, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi (the self-appointed Caliph Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi Qureshi al Hussaini). The TTP is still formally allied with al Qaeda, and operates mainly in Pakistan’s northwestern tribal areas near the border with Afghanistan.
It is reported that Shahidullah Shahid, the TTP’ spokesman, and five senior members and important regional leaders of the movement vowed allegiance to the IS; in particular the leaders who declared their support to the IS are the regional heads in the northwestern cities of Peshawar, Hangu, the Orakzai, Kurram and Khyber tribal areas (in total is assessed the amount of the defecting groups could involve 700/1000 fighters).
This event, which could underscores divisions among Islamist Armed Opposition Groups as the IS rises, marked the first instance of a major contingent of Taliban figures signaling, on the one hand, a renouncement of fealty to the Afghan Taliban’s leader, Mullah Mohammad Omar; on the other hand, this shift in loyalties could, firstly, weaken the Afghan Taliban and, secondly, create more vulnerabilities to the Pakistan and Afghanistan states because of the violence and the aggressive policy largely used by the IS in Iraq and Syria.
But, what is important to underline is that, even if these commanders could remain part of the Pakistani Taliban’s organization, they will probably represent IS in Pakistan.
IS, Al-Qaeda and Jihadi propaganda in Pakistan, Afghanistan and India: weakness and strengths.
There are signs that the IS could gain grip in South East Asian countries, in particular in Pakistan, thanks to propaganda and recruitment activities. In October, a manifesto was distributed in Peshawar areas, inviting people to join the group in order to establish a Muslim caliphate; at the same time stickers and wall drawings have been spotted, as well as sporting IS t-shirts have been distributed within Indian Muslim areas.
In addition, open sources reported that some Pakistanis and Afghanis are operating in Syria and Iraq fighting under the IS flag, as well as some Indians joined IS.
As response, Al-Qaeda is actively reacting to IS initiatives. One example is represented by the video message released by the Al Qaeda head, Ayman al-Zawahiri, announcing the establishment of a new group named “Qaedat al-Jihad in the Indian subcontinent”. This initiative, after a long-silence period, could be read as a sign that al-Qaeda is reacting to the IS pressure and “successes” in the Middle East and the attempt to penetrate South East Asia.
In the message, Zawahiri discussed “differences and discord” among jihadists – with possible reference to IS – and called Jihadi fighters to unite, invoking Osama bin Laden, insisting on the concepts of artificial borders (to be deleted) and the “Tawhid” (monotheism).
Simultaneously, the competition is conducted on the “virtual” front through social media campaigns on “Twitter”, “Facebook”, “Youtube”, “Instagram”; in this case IS is winning the competition thanks to an aggressive, effective and successful communication strategy based on western approach and methods.
It is clear that these simultaneous efforts aimed to recruiting fighters and supporters are signs that both the groups are in competition for the dominance in the region, with al Qaeda in trouble seeking to reassert its supremacy as a bursting IS raises in attractiveness.
There are signs that the IS could gain grip in South East Asian countries, in particular in Pakistan, thanks to propaganda and recruitment activities. In October, a manifesto was distributed in Peshawar areas, inviting people to join the group in order to establish a Muslim caliphate; at the same time stickers and wall drawings have been spotted, as well as sporting IS t-shirts have been distributed within Indian Muslim areas.
In addition, open sources reported that some Pakistanis and Afghanis are operating in Syria and Iraq fighting under the IS flag, as well as some Indians joined IS.
As response, Al-Qaeda is actively reacting to IS initiatives. One example is represented by the video message released by the Al Qaeda head, Ayman al-Zawahiri, announcing the establishment of a new group named “Qaedat al-Jihad in the Indian subcontinent”. This initiative, after a long-silence period, could be read as a sign that al-Qaeda is reacting to the IS pressure and “successes” in the Middle East and the attempt to penetrate South East Asia.
In the message, Zawahiri discussed “differences and discord” among jihadists – with possible reference to IS – and called Jihadi fighters to unite, invoking Osama bin Laden, insisting on the concepts of artificial borders (to be deleted) and the “Tawhid” (monotheism).
Simultaneously, the competition is conducted on the “virtual” front through social media campaigns on “Twitter”, “Facebook”, “Youtube”, “Instagram”; in this case IS is winning the competition thanks to an aggressive, effective and successful communication strategy based on western approach and methods.
It is clear that these simultaneous efforts aimed to recruiting fighters and supporters are signs that both the groups are in competition for the dominance in the region, with al Qaeda in trouble seeking to reassert its supremacy as a bursting IS raises in attractiveness.
Brief Analysis
On the one hand, the sum and the connections of the dynamics deriving from the entry of a new group in the area of Afghanistan, Pakistan and India, could drive to more violence; as consequence tensions will rise increasing divisions among the groups, in particular involving more communities and armed opposition groups, religious minorities in Pakistan, India and Afghanistan, as well as non-Sunni Muslims, and those Jihadists consider as heretics. It is assessed that overall violence in the region is likely to rise because if a group is conducting a more aggressive campaign, the other groups will also escalate their activities and initiatives. This could be a direct threat to the stability of Afghanistan and to the US and Nato’s role in the country.
On the other hand, as consequence of the changed equilibrium, Al Qaeda and the IS have significantly stepped up their recruiting efforts in Pakistan and in other South East Asian countries; it changed the regional dynamics: a change which must stimulate analysts and governments to pay attention to the competition between the two groups to enlist radicalized fighters. Fighters that, in particular, could be involved in local conflicts as well as in the global jihad carried out by the IS supporters and leaders.
On the “market” of the regional Jihad there are now two different and contending brands: the traditional “Al-Qaeda style” and the modern and fashionable Islamic State. The second one continues to gain followers.
On the one hand, the sum and the connections of the dynamics deriving from the entry of a new group in the area of Afghanistan, Pakistan and India, could drive to more violence; as consequence tensions will rise increasing divisions among the groups, in particular involving more communities and armed opposition groups, religious minorities in Pakistan, India and Afghanistan, as well as non-Sunni Muslims, and those Jihadists consider as heretics. It is assessed that overall violence in the region is likely to rise because if a group is conducting a more aggressive campaign, the other groups will also escalate their activities and initiatives. This could be a direct threat to the stability of Afghanistan and to the US and Nato’s role in the country.
On the other hand, as consequence of the changed equilibrium, Al Qaeda and the IS have significantly stepped up their recruiting efforts in Pakistan and in other South East Asian countries; it changed the regional dynamics: a change which must stimulate analysts and governments to pay attention to the competition between the two groups to enlist radicalized fighters. Fighters that, in particular, could be involved in local conflicts as well as in the global jihad carried out by the IS supporters and leaders.
On the “market” of the regional Jihad there are now two different and contending brands: the traditional “Al-Qaeda style” and the modern and fashionable Islamic State. The second one continues to gain followers.
Islamic State: a threat to South East Asia (Afghanistan, Pakistan, India) and to Nato-Resolute Support Mission?
by Claudio Bertolotti
The Islamic State of Iraq and Levant (ISIL, ISIS, or more simply IS) is attempting to expand its influence from the Middle East to Asia, in particular to Pakistan, India and Afghanistan.
A possible confirmation of the results obtained by the Jihadi-group linked to the IS could be confirmed by the 4th of October declaration of allegiance of a part of the Pakistani Taliban (Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan, TTP) to the group and its chief, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi (the self-appointed Caliph Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi Qureshi al Hussaini). The TTP is still formally allied with al Qaeda, and operates mainly in Pakistan’s northwestern tribal areas near the border with Afghanistan.
It is reported that Shahidullah Shahid, the TTP’ spokesman, and five senior members and important regional leaders of the movement vowed allegiance to the IS; in particular the leaders who declared their support to the IS are the regional heads in the northwestern cities of Peshawar, Hangu, the Orakzai, Kurram and Khyber tribal areas (in total is assessed the amount of the defecting groups could involve 700/1000 fighters).
This event, which could underscores divisions among Islamist Armed Opposition Groups as the IS rises, marked the first instance of a major contingent of Taliban figures signaling, on the one hand, a renouncement of fealty to the Afghan Taliban’s leader, Mullah Mohammad Omar; on the other hand, this shift in loyalties could, firstly, weaken the Afghan Taliban and, secondly, create more vulnerabilities to the Pakistan and Afghanistan states because of the violence and the aggressive policy largely used by the IS in Iraq and Syria.
But, what is important to underline is that, even if these commanders could remain part of the Pakistani Taliban’s organization, they will probably represent IS in Pakistan.
A possible confirmation of the results obtained by the Jihadi-group linked to the IS could be confirmed by the 4th of October declaration of allegiance of a part of the Pakistani Taliban (Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan, TTP) to the group and its chief, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi (the self-appointed Caliph Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi Qureshi al Hussaini). The TTP is still formally allied with al Qaeda, and operates mainly in Pakistan’s northwestern tribal areas near the border with Afghanistan.
It is reported that Shahidullah Shahid, the TTP’ spokesman, and five senior members and important regional leaders of the movement vowed allegiance to the IS; in particular the leaders who declared their support to the IS are the regional heads in the northwestern cities of Peshawar, Hangu, the Orakzai, Kurram and Khyber tribal areas (in total is assessed the amount of the defecting groups could involve 700/1000 fighters).
This event, which could underscores divisions among Islamist Armed Opposition Groups as the IS rises, marked the first instance of a major contingent of Taliban figures signaling, on the one hand, a renouncement of fealty to the Afghan Taliban’s leader, Mullah Mohammad Omar; on the other hand, this shift in loyalties could, firstly, weaken the Afghan Taliban and, secondly, create more vulnerabilities to the Pakistan and Afghanistan states because of the violence and the aggressive policy largely used by the IS in Iraq and Syria.
But, what is important to underline is that, even if these commanders could remain part of the Pakistani Taliban’s organization, they will probably represent IS in Pakistan.
IS, Al-Qaeda and Jihadi propaganda in Pakistan, Afghanistan and India: weakness and strengths.
There are signs that the IS could gain grip in South East Asian countries, in particular in Pakistan, thanks to propaganda and recruitment activities. In October, a manifesto was distributed in Peshawar areas, inviting people to join the group in order to establish a Muslim caliphate; at the same time stickers and wall drawings have been spotted, as well as sporting IS t-shirts have been distributed within Indian Muslim areas.
In addition, open sources reported that some Pakistanis and Afghanis are operating in Syria and Iraq fighting under the IS flag, as well as some Indians joined IS.
As response, Al-Qaeda is actively reacting to IS initiatives. One example is represented by the video message released by the Al Qaeda head, Ayman al-Zawahiri, announcing the establishment of a new group named “Qaedat al-Jihad in the Indian subcontinent”. This initiative, after a long-silence period, could be read as a sign that al-Qaeda is reacting to the IS pressure and “successes” in the Middle East and the attempt to penetrate South East Asia.
In the message, Zawahiri discussed “differences and discord” among jihadists – with possible reference to IS – and called Jihadi fighters to unite, invoking Osama bin Laden, insisting on the concepts of artificial borders (to be deleted) and the “Tawhid” (monotheism).
Simultaneously, the competition is conducted on the “virtual” front through social media campaigns on “Twitter”, “Facebook”, “Youtube”, “Instagram”; in this case IS is winning the competition thanks to an aggressive, effective and successful communication strategy based on western approach and methods.
It is clear that these simultaneous efforts aimed to recruiting fighters and supporters are signs that both the groups are in competition for the dominance in the region, with al Qaeda in trouble seeking to reassert its supremacy as a bursting IS raises in attractiveness.
There are signs that the IS could gain grip in South East Asian countries, in particular in Pakistan, thanks to propaganda and recruitment activities. In October, a manifesto was distributed in Peshawar areas, inviting people to join the group in order to establish a Muslim caliphate; at the same time stickers and wall drawings have been spotted, as well as sporting IS t-shirts have been distributed within Indian Muslim areas.
In addition, open sources reported that some Pakistanis and Afghanis are operating in Syria and Iraq fighting under the IS flag, as well as some Indians joined IS.
As response, Al-Qaeda is actively reacting to IS initiatives. One example is represented by the video message released by the Al Qaeda head, Ayman al-Zawahiri, announcing the establishment of a new group named “Qaedat al-Jihad in the Indian subcontinent”. This initiative, after a long-silence period, could be read as a sign that al-Qaeda is reacting to the IS pressure and “successes” in the Middle East and the attempt to penetrate South East Asia.
In the message, Zawahiri discussed “differences and discord” among jihadists – with possible reference to IS – and called Jihadi fighters to unite, invoking Osama bin Laden, insisting on the concepts of artificial borders (to be deleted) and the “Tawhid” (monotheism).
Simultaneously, the competition is conducted on the “virtual” front through social media campaigns on “Twitter”, “Facebook”, “Youtube”, “Instagram”; in this case IS is winning the competition thanks to an aggressive, effective and successful communication strategy based on western approach and methods.
It is clear that these simultaneous efforts aimed to recruiting fighters and supporters are signs that both the groups are in competition for the dominance in the region, with al Qaeda in trouble seeking to reassert its supremacy as a bursting IS raises in attractiveness.
Brief Analysis
On the one hand, the sum and the connections of the dynamics deriving from the entry of a new group in the area of Afghanistan, Pakistan and India, could drive to more violence; as consequence tensions will rise increasing divisions among the groups, in particular involving more communities and armed opposition groups, religious minorities in Pakistan, India and Afghanistan, as well as non-Sunni Muslims, and those Jihadists consider as heretics. It is assessed that overall violence in the region is likely to rise because if a group is conducting a more aggressive campaign, the other groups will also escalate their activities and initiatives. This could be a direct threat to the stability of Afghanistan and to the US and Nato’s role in the country.
On the other hand, as consequence of the changed equilibrium, Al Qaeda and the IS have significantly stepped up their recruiting efforts in Pakistan and in other South East Asian countries; it changed the regional dynamics: a change which must stimulate analysts and governments to pay attention to the competition between the two groups to enlist radicalized fighters. Fighters that, in particular, could be involved in local conflicts as well as in the global jihad carried out by the IS supporters and leaders.
On the “market” of the regional Jihad there are now two different and contending brands: the traditional “Al-Qaeda style” and the modern and fashionable Islamic State. The second one continues to gain followers.
On the one hand, the sum and the connections of the dynamics deriving from the entry of a new group in the area of Afghanistan, Pakistan and India, could drive to more violence; as consequence tensions will rise increasing divisions among the groups, in particular involving more communities and armed opposition groups, religious minorities in Pakistan, India and Afghanistan, as well as non-Sunni Muslims, and those Jihadists consider as heretics. It is assessed that overall violence in the region is likely to rise because if a group is conducting a more aggressive campaign, the other groups will also escalate their activities and initiatives. This could be a direct threat to the stability of Afghanistan and to the US and Nato’s role in the country.
On the other hand, as consequence of the changed equilibrium, Al Qaeda and the IS have significantly stepped up their recruiting efforts in Pakistan and in other South East Asian countries; it changed the regional dynamics: a change which must stimulate analysts and governments to pay attention to the competition between the two groups to enlist radicalized fighters. Fighters that, in particular, could be involved in local conflicts as well as in the global jihad carried out by the IS supporters and leaders.
On the “market” of the regional Jihad there are now two different and contending brands: the traditional “Al-Qaeda style” and the modern and fashionable Islamic State. The second one continues to gain followers.
Islamic State: a threat to South East Asia (Afghanistan, Pakistan, India) and to Nato-Resolute Support Mission?
by Claudio Bertolotti
The Islamic State of Iraq and Levant (ISIL, ISIS, or more simply IS) is attempting to expand its influence from the Middle East to Asia, in particular to Pakistan, India and Afghanistan.
A possible confirmation of the results obtained by the Jihadi-group linked to the IS could be confirmed by the 4th of October declaration of allegiance of a part of the Pakistani Taliban (Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan, TTP) to the group and its chief, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi (the self-appointed Caliph Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi Qureshi al Hussaini). The TTP is still formally allied with al Qaeda, and operates mainly in Pakistan’s northwestern tribal areas near the border with Afghanistan.
It is reported that Shahidullah Shahid, the TTP’ spokesman, and five senior members and important regional leaders of the movement vowed allegiance to the IS; in particular the leaders who declared their support to the IS are the regional heads in the northwestern cities of Peshawar, Hangu, the Orakzai, Kurram and Khyber tribal areas (in total is assessed the amount of the defecting groups could involve 700/1000 fighters).
This event, which could underscores divisions among Islamist Armed Opposition Groups as the IS rises, marked the first instance of a major contingent of Taliban figures signaling, on the one hand, a renouncement of fealty to the Afghan Taliban’s leader, Mullah Mohammad Omar; on the other hand, this shift in loyalties could, firstly, weaken the Afghan Taliban and, secondly, create more vulnerabilities to the Pakistan and Afghanistan states because of the violence and the aggressive policy largely used by the IS in Iraq and Syria.
But, what is important to underline is that, even if these commanders could remain part of the Pakistani Taliban’s organization, they will probably represent IS in Pakistan.
A possible confirmation of the results obtained by the Jihadi-group linked to the IS could be confirmed by the 4th of October declaration of allegiance of a part of the Pakistani Taliban (Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan, TTP) to the group and its chief, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi (the self-appointed Caliph Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi Qureshi al Hussaini). The TTP is still formally allied with al Qaeda, and operates mainly in Pakistan’s northwestern tribal areas near the border with Afghanistan.
It is reported that Shahidullah Shahid, the TTP’ spokesman, and five senior members and important regional leaders of the movement vowed allegiance to the IS; in particular the leaders who declared their support to the IS are the regional heads in the northwestern cities of Peshawar, Hangu, the Orakzai, Kurram and Khyber tribal areas (in total is assessed the amount of the defecting groups could involve 700/1000 fighters).
This event, which could underscores divisions among Islamist Armed Opposition Groups as the IS rises, marked the first instance of a major contingent of Taliban figures signaling, on the one hand, a renouncement of fealty to the Afghan Taliban’s leader, Mullah Mohammad Omar; on the other hand, this shift in loyalties could, firstly, weaken the Afghan Taliban and, secondly, create more vulnerabilities to the Pakistan and Afghanistan states because of the violence and the aggressive policy largely used by the IS in Iraq and Syria.
But, what is important to underline is that, even if these commanders could remain part of the Pakistani Taliban’s organization, they will probably represent IS in Pakistan.
IS, Al-Qaeda and Jihadi propaganda in Pakistan, Afghanistan and India: weakness and strengths.
There are signs that the IS could gain grip in South East Asian countries, in particular in Pakistan, thanks to propaganda and recruitment activities. In October, a manifesto was distributed in Peshawar areas, inviting people to join the group in order to establish a Muslim caliphate; at the same time stickers and wall drawings have been spotted, as well as sporting IS t-shirts have been distributed within Indian Muslim areas.
In addition, open sources reported that some Pakistanis and Afghanis are operating in Syria and Iraq fighting under the IS flag, as well as some Indians joined IS.
As response, Al-Qaeda is actively reacting to IS initiatives. One example is represented by the video message released by the Al Qaeda head, Ayman al-Zawahiri, announcing the establishment of a new group named “Qaedat al-Jihad in the Indian subcontinent”. This initiative, after a long-silence period, could be read as a sign that al-Qaeda is reacting to the IS pressure and “successes” in the Middle East and the attempt to penetrate South East Asia.
In the message, Zawahiri discussed “differences and discord” among jihadists – with possible reference to IS – and called Jihadi fighters to unite, invoking Osama bin Laden, insisting on the concepts of artificial borders (to be deleted) and the “Tawhid” (monotheism).
Simultaneously, the competition is conducted on the “virtual” front through social media campaigns on “Twitter”, “Facebook”, “Youtube”, “Instagram”; in this case IS is winning the competition thanks to an aggressive, effective and successful communication strategy based on western approach and methods.
It is clear that these simultaneous efforts aimed to recruiting fighters and supporters are signs that both the groups are in competition for the dominance in the region, with al Qaeda in trouble seeking to reassert its supremacy as a bursting IS raises in attractiveness.
There are signs that the IS could gain grip in South East Asian countries, in particular in Pakistan, thanks to propaganda and recruitment activities. In October, a manifesto was distributed in Peshawar areas, inviting people to join the group in order to establish a Muslim caliphate; at the same time stickers and wall drawings have been spotted, as well as sporting IS t-shirts have been distributed within Indian Muslim areas.
In addition, open sources reported that some Pakistanis and Afghanis are operating in Syria and Iraq fighting under the IS flag, as well as some Indians joined IS.
As response, Al-Qaeda is actively reacting to IS initiatives. One example is represented by the video message released by the Al Qaeda head, Ayman al-Zawahiri, announcing the establishment of a new group named “Qaedat al-Jihad in the Indian subcontinent”. This initiative, after a long-silence period, could be read as a sign that al-Qaeda is reacting to the IS pressure and “successes” in the Middle East and the attempt to penetrate South East Asia.
In the message, Zawahiri discussed “differences and discord” among jihadists – with possible reference to IS – and called Jihadi fighters to unite, invoking Osama bin Laden, insisting on the concepts of artificial borders (to be deleted) and the “Tawhid” (monotheism).
Simultaneously, the competition is conducted on the “virtual” front through social media campaigns on “Twitter”, “Facebook”, “Youtube”, “Instagram”; in this case IS is winning the competition thanks to an aggressive, effective and successful communication strategy based on western approach and methods.
It is clear that these simultaneous efforts aimed to recruiting fighters and supporters are signs that both the groups are in competition for the dominance in the region, with al Qaeda in trouble seeking to reassert its supremacy as a bursting IS raises in attractiveness.
Brief Analysis
On the one hand, the sum and the connections of the dynamics deriving from the entry of a new group in the area of Afghanistan, Pakistan and India, could drive to more violence; as consequence tensions will rise increasing divisions among the groups, in particular involving more communities and armed opposition groups, religious minorities in Pakistan, India and Afghanistan, as well as non-Sunni Muslims, and those Jihadists consider as heretics. It is assessed that overall violence in the region is likely to rise because if a group is conducting a more aggressive campaign, the other groups will also escalate their activities and initiatives. This could be a direct threat to the stability of Afghanistan and to the US and Nato’s role in the country.
On the other hand, as consequence of the changed equilibrium, Al Qaeda and the IS have significantly stepped up their recruiting efforts in Pakistan and in other South East Asian countries; it changed the regional dynamics: a change which must stimulate analysts and governments to pay attention to the competition between the two groups to enlist radicalized fighters. Fighters that, in particular, could be involved in local conflicts as well as in the global jihad carried out by the IS supporters and leaders.
On the “market” of the regional Jihad there are now two different and contending brands: the traditional “Al-Qaeda style” and the modern and fashionable Islamic State. The second one continues to gain followers.
On the one hand, the sum and the connections of the dynamics deriving from the entry of a new group in the area of Afghanistan, Pakistan and India, could drive to more violence; as consequence tensions will rise increasing divisions among the groups, in particular involving more communities and armed opposition groups, religious minorities in Pakistan, India and Afghanistan, as well as non-Sunni Muslims, and those Jihadists consider as heretics. It is assessed that overall violence in the region is likely to rise because if a group is conducting a more aggressive campaign, the other groups will also escalate their activities and initiatives. This could be a direct threat to the stability of Afghanistan and to the US and Nato’s role in the country.
On the other hand, as consequence of the changed equilibrium, Al Qaeda and the IS have significantly stepped up their recruiting efforts in Pakistan and in other South East Asian countries; it changed the regional dynamics: a change which must stimulate analysts and governments to pay attention to the competition between the two groups to enlist radicalized fighters. Fighters that, in particular, could be involved in local conflicts as well as in the global jihad carried out by the IS supporters and leaders.
On the “market” of the regional Jihad there are now two different and contending brands: the traditional “Al-Qaeda style” and the modern and fashionable Islamic State. The second one continues to gain followers.
Islamic State: a threat to South East Asia (Afghanistan, Pakistan, India) and to Nato-Resolute Support Mission?
by Claudio Bertolotti
The Islamic State of Iraq and Levant (ISIL, ISIS, or more simply IS) is attempting to expand its influence from the Middle East to Asia, in particular to Pakistan, India and Afghanistan.
A possible confirmation of the results obtained by the Jihadi-group linked to the IS could be confirmed by the 4th of October declaration of allegiance of a part of the Pakistani Taliban (Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan, TTP) to the group and its chief, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi (the self-appointed Caliph Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi Qureshi al Hussaini). The TTP is still formally allied with al Qaeda, and operates mainly in Pakistan’s northwestern tribal areas near the border with Afghanistan.
It is reported that Shahidullah Shahid, the TTP’ spokesman, and five senior members and important regional leaders of the movement vowed allegiance to the IS; in particular the leaders who declared their support to the IS are the regional heads in the northwestern cities of Peshawar, Hangu, the Orakzai, Kurram and Khyber tribal areas (in total is assessed the amount of the defecting groups could involve 700/1000 fighters).
This event, which could underscores divisions among Islamist Armed Opposition Groups as the IS rises, marked the first instance of a major contingent of Taliban figures signaling, on the one hand, a renouncement of fealty to the Afghan Taliban’s leader, Mullah Mohammad Omar; on the other hand, this shift in loyalties could, firstly, weaken the Afghan Taliban and, secondly, create more vulnerabilities to the Pakistan and Afghanistan states because of the violence and the aggressive policy largely used by the IS in Iraq and Syria.
But, what is important to underline is that, even if these commanders could remain part of the Pakistani Taliban’s organization, they will probably represent IS in Pakistan.
A possible confirmation of the results obtained by the Jihadi-group linked to the IS could be confirmed by the 4th of October declaration of allegiance of a part of the Pakistani Taliban (Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan, TTP) to the group and its chief, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi (the self-appointed Caliph Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi Qureshi al Hussaini). The TTP is still formally allied with al Qaeda, and operates mainly in Pakistan’s northwestern tribal areas near the border with Afghanistan.
It is reported that Shahidullah Shahid, the TTP’ spokesman, and five senior members and important regional leaders of the movement vowed allegiance to the IS; in particular the leaders who declared their support to the IS are the regional heads in the northwestern cities of Peshawar, Hangu, the Orakzai, Kurram and Khyber tribal areas (in total is assessed the amount of the defecting groups could involve 700/1000 fighters).
This event, which could underscores divisions among Islamist Armed Opposition Groups as the IS rises, marked the first instance of a major contingent of Taliban figures signaling, on the one hand, a renouncement of fealty to the Afghan Taliban’s leader, Mullah Mohammad Omar; on the other hand, this shift in loyalties could, firstly, weaken the Afghan Taliban and, secondly, create more vulnerabilities to the Pakistan and Afghanistan states because of the violence and the aggressive policy largely used by the IS in Iraq and Syria.
But, what is important to underline is that, even if these commanders could remain part of the Pakistani Taliban’s organization, they will probably represent IS in Pakistan.
IS, Al-Qaeda and Jihadi propaganda in Pakistan, Afghanistan and India: weakness and strengths.
There are signs that the IS could gain grip in South East Asian countries, in particular in Pakistan, thanks to propaganda and recruitment activities. In October, a manifesto was distributed in Peshawar areas, inviting people to join the group in order to establish a Muslim caliphate; at the same time stickers and wall drawings have been spotted, as well as sporting IS t-shirts have been distributed within Indian Muslim areas.
In addition, open sources reported that some Pakistanis and Afghanis are operating in Syria and Iraq fighting under the IS flag, as well as some Indians joined IS.
As response, Al-Qaeda is actively reacting to IS initiatives. One example is represented by the video message released by the Al Qaeda head, Ayman al-Zawahiri, announcing the establishment of a new group named “Qaedat al-Jihad in the Indian subcontinent”. This initiative, after a long-silence period, could be read as a sign that al-Qaeda is reacting to the IS pressure and “successes” in the Middle East and the attempt to penetrate South East Asia.
In the message, Zawahiri discussed “differences and discord” among jihadists – with possible reference to IS – and called Jihadi fighters to unite, invoking Osama bin Laden, insisting on the concepts of artificial borders (to be deleted) and the “Tawhid” (monotheism).
Simultaneously, the competition is conducted on the “virtual” front through social media campaigns on “Twitter”, “Facebook”, “Youtube”, “Instagram”; in this case IS is winning the competition thanks to an aggressive, effective and successful communication strategy based on western approach and methods.
It is clear that these simultaneous efforts aimed to recruiting fighters and supporters are signs that both the groups are in competition for the dominance in the region, with al Qaeda in trouble seeking to reassert its supremacy as a bursting IS raises in attractiveness.
There are signs that the IS could gain grip in South East Asian countries, in particular in Pakistan, thanks to propaganda and recruitment activities. In October, a manifesto was distributed in Peshawar areas, inviting people to join the group in order to establish a Muslim caliphate; at the same time stickers and wall drawings have been spotted, as well as sporting IS t-shirts have been distributed within Indian Muslim areas.
In addition, open sources reported that some Pakistanis and Afghanis are operating in Syria and Iraq fighting under the IS flag, as well as some Indians joined IS.
As response, Al-Qaeda is actively reacting to IS initiatives. One example is represented by the video message released by the Al Qaeda head, Ayman al-Zawahiri, announcing the establishment of a new group named “Qaedat al-Jihad in the Indian subcontinent”. This initiative, after a long-silence period, could be read as a sign that al-Qaeda is reacting to the IS pressure and “successes” in the Middle East and the attempt to penetrate South East Asia.
In the message, Zawahiri discussed “differences and discord” among jihadists – with possible reference to IS – and called Jihadi fighters to unite, invoking Osama bin Laden, insisting on the concepts of artificial borders (to be deleted) and the “Tawhid” (monotheism).
Simultaneously, the competition is conducted on the “virtual” front through social media campaigns on “Twitter”, “Facebook”, “Youtube”, “Instagram”; in this case IS is winning the competition thanks to an aggressive, effective and successful communication strategy based on western approach and methods.
It is clear that these simultaneous efforts aimed to recruiting fighters and supporters are signs that both the groups are in competition for the dominance in the region, with al Qaeda in trouble seeking to reassert its supremacy as a bursting IS raises in attractiveness.
Brief Analysis
On the one hand, the sum and the connections of the dynamics deriving from the entry of a new group in the area of Afghanistan, Pakistan and India, could drive to more violence; as consequence tensions will rise increasing divisions among the groups, in particular involving more communities and armed opposition groups, religious minorities in Pakistan, India and Afghanistan, as well as non-Sunni Muslims, and those Jihadists consider as heretics. It is assessed that overall violence in the region is likely to rise because if a group is conducting a more aggressive campaign, the other groups will also escalate their activities and initiatives. This could be a direct threat to the stability of Afghanistan and to the US and Nato’s role in the country.
On the other hand, as consequence of the changed equilibrium, Al Qaeda and the IS have significantly stepped up their recruiting efforts in Pakistan and in other South East Asian countries; it changed the regional dynamics: a change which must stimulate analysts and governments to pay attention to the competition between the two groups to enlist radicalized fighters. Fighters that, in particular, could be involved in local conflicts as well as in the global jihad carried out by the IS supporters and leaders.
On the “market” of the regional Jihad there are now two different and contending brands: the traditional “Al-Qaeda style” and the modern and fashionable Islamic State. The second one continues to gain followers.
On the one hand, the sum and the connections of the dynamics deriving from the entry of a new group in the area of Afghanistan, Pakistan and India, could drive to more violence; as consequence tensions will rise increasing divisions among the groups, in particular involving more communities and armed opposition groups, religious minorities in Pakistan, India and Afghanistan, as well as non-Sunni Muslims, and those Jihadists consider as heretics. It is assessed that overall violence in the region is likely to rise because if a group is conducting a more aggressive campaign, the other groups will also escalate their activities and initiatives. This could be a direct threat to the stability of Afghanistan and to the US and Nato’s role in the country.
On the other hand, as consequence of the changed equilibrium, Al Qaeda and the IS have significantly stepped up their recruiting efforts in Pakistan and in other South East Asian countries; it changed the regional dynamics: a change which must stimulate analysts and governments to pay attention to the competition between the two groups to enlist radicalized fighters. Fighters that, in particular, could be involved in local conflicts as well as in the global jihad carried out by the IS supporters and leaders.
On the “market” of the regional Jihad there are now two different and contending brands: the traditional “Al-Qaeda style” and the modern and fashionable Islamic State. The second one continues to gain followers.
Islamic State: a threat to South East Asia (Afghanistan, Pakistan, India) and to Nato-Resolute Support Mission?
by Claudio Bertolotti
The Islamic State of Iraq and Levant (ISIL, ISIS, or more simply IS) is attempting to expand its influence from the Middle East to Asia, in particular to Pakistan, India and Afghanistan.
A possible confirmation of the results obtained by the Jihadi-group linked to the IS could be confirmed by the 4th of October declaration of allegiance of a part of the Pakistani Taliban (Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan, TTP) to the group and its chief, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi (the self-appointed Caliph Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi Qureshi al Hussaini). The TTP is still formally allied with al Qaeda, and operates mainly in Pakistan’s northwestern tribal areas near the border with Afghanistan.
It is reported that Shahidullah Shahid, the TTP’ spokesman, and five senior members and important regional leaders of the movement vowed allegiance to the IS; in particular the leaders who declared their support to the IS are the regional heads in the northwestern cities of Peshawar, Hangu, the Orakzai, Kurram and Khyber tribal areas (in total is assessed the amount of the defecting groups could involve 700/1000 fighters).
This event, which could underscores divisions among Islamist Armed Opposition Groups as the IS rises, marked the first instance of a major contingent of Taliban figures signaling, on the one hand, a renouncement of fealty to the Afghan Taliban’s leader, Mullah Mohammad Omar; on the other hand, this shift in loyalties could, firstly, weaken the Afghan Taliban and, secondly, create more vulnerabilities to the Pakistan and Afghanistan states because of the violence and the aggressive policy largely used by the IS in Iraq and Syria.
But, what is important to underline is that, even if these commanders could remain part of the Pakistani Taliban’s organization, they will probably represent IS in Pakistan.
A possible confirmation of the results obtained by the Jihadi-group linked to the IS could be confirmed by the 4th of October declaration of allegiance of a part of the Pakistani Taliban (Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan, TTP) to the group and its chief, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi (the self-appointed Caliph Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi Qureshi al Hussaini). The TTP is still formally allied with al Qaeda, and operates mainly in Pakistan’s northwestern tribal areas near the border with Afghanistan.
It is reported that Shahidullah Shahid, the TTP’ spokesman, and five senior members and important regional leaders of the movement vowed allegiance to the IS; in particular the leaders who declared their support to the IS are the regional heads in the northwestern cities of Peshawar, Hangu, the Orakzai, Kurram and Khyber tribal areas (in total is assessed the amount of the defecting groups could involve 700/1000 fighters).
This event, which could underscores divisions among Islamist Armed Opposition Groups as the IS rises, marked the first instance of a major contingent of Taliban figures signaling, on the one hand, a renouncement of fealty to the Afghan Taliban’s leader, Mullah Mohammad Omar; on the other hand, this shift in loyalties could, firstly, weaken the Afghan Taliban and, secondly, create more vulnerabilities to the Pakistan and Afghanistan states because of the violence and the aggressive policy largely used by the IS in Iraq and Syria.
But, what is important to underline is that, even if these commanders could remain part of the Pakistani Taliban’s organization, they will probably represent IS in Pakistan.
IS, Al-Qaeda and Jihadi propaganda in Pakistan, Afghanistan and India: weakness and strengths.
There are signs that the IS could gain grip in South East Asian countries, in particular in Pakistan, thanks to propaganda and recruitment activities. In October, a manifesto was distributed in Peshawar areas, inviting people to join the group in order to establish a Muslim caliphate; at the same time stickers and wall drawings have been spotted, as well as sporting IS t-shirts have been distributed within Indian Muslim areas.
In addition, open sources reported that some Pakistanis and Afghanis are operating in Syria and Iraq fighting under the IS flag, as well as some Indians joined IS.
As response, Al-Qaeda is actively reacting to IS initiatives. One example is represented by the video message released by the Al Qaeda head, Ayman al-Zawahiri, announcing the establishment of a new group named “Qaedat al-Jihad in the Indian subcontinent”. This initiative, after a long-silence period, could be read as a sign that al-Qaeda is reacting to the IS pressure and “successes” in the Middle East and the attempt to penetrate South East Asia.
In the message, Zawahiri discussed “differences and discord” among jihadists – with possible reference to IS – and called Jihadi fighters to unite, invoking Osama bin Laden, insisting on the concepts of artificial borders (to be deleted) and the “Tawhid” (monotheism).
Simultaneously, the competition is conducted on the “virtual” front through social media campaigns on “Twitter”, “Facebook”, “Youtube”, “Instagram”; in this case IS is winning the competition thanks to an aggressive, effective and successful communication strategy based on western approach and methods.
It is clear that these simultaneous efforts aimed to recruiting fighters and supporters are signs that both the groups are in competition for the dominance in the region, with al Qaeda in trouble seeking to reassert its supremacy as a bursting IS raises in attractiveness.
There are signs that the IS could gain grip in South East Asian countries, in particular in Pakistan, thanks to propaganda and recruitment activities. In October, a manifesto was distributed in Peshawar areas, inviting people to join the group in order to establish a Muslim caliphate; at the same time stickers and wall drawings have been spotted, as well as sporting IS t-shirts have been distributed within Indian Muslim areas.
In addition, open sources reported that some Pakistanis and Afghanis are operating in Syria and Iraq fighting under the IS flag, as well as some Indians joined IS.
As response, Al-Qaeda is actively reacting to IS initiatives. One example is represented by the video message released by the Al Qaeda head, Ayman al-Zawahiri, announcing the establishment of a new group named “Qaedat al-Jihad in the Indian subcontinent”. This initiative, after a long-silence period, could be read as a sign that al-Qaeda is reacting to the IS pressure and “successes” in the Middle East and the attempt to penetrate South East Asia.
In the message, Zawahiri discussed “differences and discord” among jihadists – with possible reference to IS – and called Jihadi fighters to unite, invoking Osama bin Laden, insisting on the concepts of artificial borders (to be deleted) and the “Tawhid” (monotheism).
Simultaneously, the competition is conducted on the “virtual” front through social media campaigns on “Twitter”, “Facebook”, “Youtube”, “Instagram”; in this case IS is winning the competition thanks to an aggressive, effective and successful communication strategy based on western approach and methods.
It is clear that these simultaneous efforts aimed to recruiting fighters and supporters are signs that both the groups are in competition for the dominance in the region, with al Qaeda in trouble seeking to reassert its supremacy as a bursting IS raises in attractiveness.
Brief Analysis
On the one hand, the sum and the connections of the dynamics deriving from the entry of a new group in the area of Afghanistan, Pakistan and India, could drive to more violence; as consequence tensions will rise increasing divisions among the groups, in particular involving more communities and armed opposition groups, religious minorities in Pakistan, India and Afghanistan, as well as non-Sunni Muslims, and those Jihadists consider as heretics. It is assessed that overall violence in the region is likely to rise because if a group is conducting a more aggressive campaign, the other groups will also escalate their activities and initiatives. This could be a direct threat to the stability of Afghanistan and to the US and Nato’s role in the country.
On the other hand, as consequence of the changed equilibrium, Al Qaeda and the IS have significantly stepped up their recruiting efforts in Pakistan and in other South East Asian countries; it changed the regional dynamics: a change which must stimulate analysts and governments to pay attention to the competition between the two groups to enlist radicalized fighters. Fighters that, in particular, could be involved in local conflicts as well as in the global jihad carried out by the IS supporters and leaders.
On the “market” of the regional Jihad there are now two different and contending brands: the traditional “Al-Qaeda style” and the modern and fashionable Islamic State. The second one continues to gain followers.
On the one hand, the sum and the connections of the dynamics deriving from the entry of a new group in the area of Afghanistan, Pakistan and India, could drive to more violence; as consequence tensions will rise increasing divisions among the groups, in particular involving more communities and armed opposition groups, religious minorities in Pakistan, India and Afghanistan, as well as non-Sunni Muslims, and those Jihadists consider as heretics. It is assessed that overall violence in the region is likely to rise because if a group is conducting a more aggressive campaign, the other groups will also escalate their activities and initiatives. This could be a direct threat to the stability of Afghanistan and to the US and Nato’s role in the country.
On the other hand, as consequence of the changed equilibrium, Al Qaeda and the IS have significantly stepped up their recruiting efforts in Pakistan and in other South East Asian countries; it changed the regional dynamics: a change which must stimulate analysts and governments to pay attention to the competition between the two groups to enlist radicalized fighters. Fighters that, in particular, could be involved in local conflicts as well as in the global jihad carried out by the IS supporters and leaders.
On the “market” of the regional Jihad there are now two different and contending brands: the traditional “Al-Qaeda style” and the modern and fashionable Islamic State. The second one continues to gain followers.
Tunisia nel 2014: un anno per tornare al secolarismo
Di Marwan Shalala. Elaph (30/12/2014). Traduzione e sintesi di Roberta Papaleo. La Tunisia ha scelto il 2014 per essere presa a modello come esperienza democratica, soddisfacendo quelle richieste che presero vita nel 2011 nella cosiddetta “rivoluzione dei gelsomini” scatenando un’ondata arrivata fino in Libia, Egitto, Yemen e Siria. Non c’è dubbio che l’esperienza democratica tunisina sia […]
L’articolo Tunisia nel 2014: un anno per tornare al secolarismo sembra essere il primo su Arabpress.
Deviations libanesi
Come si legge nella descrizione della pagina Facebook, dopo Los Angeles, Tokyo e Londra, il marchio Deviations ha scelto il Libano come sede dei suoi abiti “Dress in Peace”. Gli stilisti Amer Jabali e Daniele Kiridijian si sono incontrati a quanto dichiarano per dare ad ogni donna la propria identità e personalità. Un look d’avanguardia con […]
L’articolo Deviations libanesi sembra essere il primo su Arabpress.
#Siria – 30 dicembre 2014 – Le forze governative siriane hanno ripreso questa m…
#Siria – 30 dicembre 2014 –
Le forze governative siriane hanno ripreso questa mattina i bombardamenti su diverse zone controllate dall’opposizione conducendo attacchi aerei su aree nelle province di Homs, Hama, Idlib e Damasco. Due attacchi aerei, …
Chronik-Fotos
#Siria – 30 dicembre 2014 –
Le forze governative siriane hanno ripreso questa mattina i bombardamenti su diverse zone controllate dall’opposizione conducendo attacchi aerei su aree nelle province di Homs, Hama, Idlib e Damasco. Due attacchi aerei, cui sono seguiti colpi di artiglieria, hanno colpito il quartiere densamente popolato di Waer, nella città di Homs, uccidendo una bambina e causando diversi feriti tra i civili, mentre altri barili esplosivi sono stati sganciati dagli elicotteri militari siriani sulla citadina di Talbisah.
A Damasco, almeno 8 gli attacchi aerei condotti sul distretto di Jobar, mentre altri 6 barili esplosivi hanno colpito il sobborgo di Daraya, nella regione della Ghouta occidentale.
– Homs
I primi momenti dopo i bombardamenti aerei condotti dall’aviazione siriana sul quartiere di Waer a Homs
http://youtu.be/HysNrjXeYEw
Fumo nelle strade del quartiere di Waer
http://youtu.be/3euNkGxyrZk
Fumo si leva dal quartiere di Waer dopo la caduta di un barile esplosivo sganciato da un velivolo militare del regime
http://youtu.be/cfG5_fBnHQM
Bombardamenti aerei dell’aviazione siriana sulla cittadina di Talbisah
http://youtu.be/4lLgv1Zsnog
Video che mostra il momento in cui un terzo barile esplosivo colpisce Talbisah
http://youtu.be/fIYOoTsHB68
[Foto] Un bambino rimasto ferito nei bombardamenti su Talbisah
http://bit.ly/1A7JCih
– Damasco
Video che mostra il momento in cui un elicottero militare del regime sgancia quattro bombe barile sul sobborgo di Daraya
https://youtu.be/gboJdgmSljY
– Hama
Il momento in cui un barile esplosivo sganciato da un elicottero siriano colpisce la località di Lattameneh in provincia di Hama
https://youtu.be/oFfil3iVcbM
https://youtu.be/2HOT3I4NpX0
La foto è stata scattata nel quartiere densamente popolato di Waer, nella città di Homs, dopo un attacco aereo dell’aviazione siriana. Continua a leggere →
#Siria – 30 dicembre 2014 – Le forze governative siriane hanno ripreso questa m…
#Siria – 30 dicembre 2014 –
Le forze governative siriane hanno ripreso questa mattina i bombardamenti su diverse zone controllate dall’opposizione conducendo attacchi aerei su aree nelle province di Homs, Hama, Idlib e Damasco. Due attacchi aerei, cui sono seguiti colpi di artiglieria, hanno colpito il quartiere densamente popolato di Waer, nella città di Homs, uccidendo una bambina e causando diversi feriti tra i civili, mentre altri barili esplosivi sono stati sganciati dagli elicotteri militari siriani sulla citadina di Talbisah.
A Damasco, almeno 8 gli attacchi aerei condotti sul distretto di Jobar, mentre altri 6 barili esplosivi hanno colpito il sobborgo di Daraya, nella regione della Ghouta occidentale.
– Homs
I primi momenti dopo i bombardamenti aerei condotti dall’aviazione siriana sul quartiere di Waer a Homs
http://youtu.be/HysNrjXeYEw
Fumo nelle strade del quartiere di Waer
http://youtu.be/3euNkGxyrZk
Fumo si leva dal quartiere di Waer dopo la caduta di un barile esplosivo sganciato da un velivolo militare del regime
http://youtu.be/cfG5_fBnHQM
Bombardamenti aerei dell’aviazione siriana sulla cittadina di Talbisah
http://youtu.be/4lLgv1Zsnog
Video che mostra il momento in cui un terzo barile esplosivo colpisce Talbisah
http://youtu.be/fIYOoTsHB68
[Foto] Un bambino rimasto ferito nei bombardamenti su Talbisah
http://bit.ly/1A7JCih
– Damasco
Video che mostra il momento in cui un elicottero militare del regime sgancia quattro bombe barile sul sobborgo di Daraya
https://youtu.be/gboJdgmSljY
– Hama
Il momento in cui un barile esplosivo sganciato da un elicottero siriano colpisce la località di Lattameneh in provincia di Hama
https://youtu.be/oFfil3iVcbM
https://youtu.be/2HOT3I4NpX0
La foto è stata scattata nel quartiere densamente popolato di Waer, nella città di Homs, dopo un attacco aereo dell’aviazione siriana.
Palestina: Israele permette a 45 studenti di lasciare Gaza
(Agenzie) Israele ha dato il permesso a 45 studenti palestinesi iscritti in scuole all’estero di lasciare la Striscia di Gaza attraverso il valico di Erez, secondo quanto riportato da Maher Abu Saba, capo dell’Autorità di Frontiera palestinese. Abu Saba ha dichiarato che la decisione è stata presa dopo che decine di studenti sono rimasti bloccati all’interno […]
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Libia: autobomba colpisce parlamento Tobruk
(Agenzie) Un’autobomba è esplosa all’interno del quartier generale del parlamento di Tobruk, in Libia, causando delle vittime. Inoltre, il parlamentare Tareq al-Garrouchi ha dichiarato che l’esplosione ha causato ingenti danni alla struttura.
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Daish pubblica intervista a pilota giordano rapito
(Agenzie). Daish (conosciuto in occidente come ISIS) ha pubblicato un’intervista con il pilota giordano catturato la scorsa settimana dai militanti a nord della Siria. L’intervista è apparsa in una forma di botta e risposta breve nell’ultimo numero di Dabiq, la rivista in inglese di Daish.
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Gli Stati Uniti e il mancato accordo di pace tra Israele e Palestina nel 2014
Di Lara Jakes. Al-Arabiya (22/12/2014). Traduzione e sintesi di Marianna Barberio. Di recente, John Kerry si è recato in Giordania con l’obiettivo di cercare un’alternativa ai piani palestinesi di allontanamento immediato di Israele dai Territori Occupati. Se, da un lato, tale visita ha rappresentato una vittoria, seppur parziale, dall’altro, ha dimostrato l’impossibilità per Kerry di riprendere […]
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Giovani palestinesi fondano Book Club a Gerusalemme
(Agenzie). In collaborazione con l’unica biblioteca pubblica palestinese a Gerusalemme, è stato fondato il Dar Issaf al-Nashashibi Book Club. “Per i palestinesi che vivono a Gerusalemme non c’è libertà di espressione, movimento o educazione”, ha dichiarato Ahmad, il fondatore del Book Club. Esso comprende due gruppi differenti: quello principale è formato da 15-20 persone di età […]
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Palestina: Hamas contro il governo su ricostruzione Gaza
(Agenzie) L’ex primo ministro di Hamas Is,ail Hinayeh ha accusato il governo di unità palestinese di non aver mantenuto il suo impegno nella ricostruzione della Striscia di Gaza. In occasione della visita di alcuni ministri palestinesi nell’enclave, Haniyeh ha dichiarato che il governo non è riuscito “a mantenere i suoi impegni: non ha portato avanti la […]
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Egitto: bandita temporaneamente festa ebraica
(Agenzie) Una corte egiziana ha bandito temporaneamente la festività ebraica della commemorazione della nascita del rabbino ebraico marocchino Jacob Abu Hasira. La corte ha detto che la sua decisione era dovuta a “offese morali” fatte negli anni precedenti durante i festeggiamenti, sebbene non abbia specificato quali. Tradizionalmente, questa festività, celebrata sin dagli accordi di pace tra […]
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Turchia: ambasciata Qatar attaccata
(Agenzie). L’ambasciata del Qatar ad Ankara, nella capitale della Turchia, è stata attaccata da un uomo armato. Secondo il giornale Hurriyet, una guardia della sicurezza turca è stata ferita durante l’attacco e portata in ospedale. Secondo quanto rilasciato dalla polizia turca, l’attentatore sarebbe già stato identificato.
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Libia: 6 milioni di dollari per domare incendi serbatoi petrolio
(Agenzie) Il governo libico riconosciuto ha concluso un contratto del valore di 6 milioni di dollari con un’azienda statunitense per spegnere gli incendi ai serbatoi di petrolio presso il porto di al-Sidr. Mohammad Bazaza, portavoce del governo, ha annunciato che i lavori inizieranno nel giro di pochi giorni. L’incendio ai serbatoi va avanti da alcuni giorni a […]
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Egitto: USA richiedono rilascio giornalisti Al-Jazeera
(Agenzie) Il Dipartimento di Stato americano ha espresso la sua “profonda preoccupazione” per la detenzione da parte dell’Egitto dei tre giornalisti di Al-Jazeera con l’accusa di legami con il terrorismo. “Continuiamo a fare pressione sul governo egiziano affinché rispetti la libertà di stampa, protegga la società civile e si attenga alla legge, cruciale per una stabilità duratura […]
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Un bilancio del sistema giudiziario egiziano nel 2014
Di Asma Ajroudi. Al-Arabiya (19/12/2014). Traduzione e sintesi di Angela Ilaria Antoniello. La magistratura egiziana è riuscita con successo a mantenere una presenza costante nei titoli dei media internazionali di quest’anno. Dalle centinaia di condanne a morte per i sostenitori dei Fratelli Musulmani, all’accusa di omicidio contro l’ex presidente Hosni Mubarak lasciata cadere, fino alle […]
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